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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is on appeal from a final judgment and a final order of the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County (Judge David S. Young). Laina
Roundy, the plaintiff-appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j). The Utah Supreme Court,
pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "poured" this appeal
"over" to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
JL

Whether, in this personal injury case, the District Court committed

reversible error in refusing to order counsel for defendant-appellee Travis Staley to
disclose a planned "surveillance video" evidentiary presentation and planned testimony
regarding that video.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this
issue appears to be de novo (as purely a question of law). "[AJppellate review of a trial
court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term ' correctness'"
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); "correctness" means "the appellate court
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's
determination of the law." Id.; State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). See,
also, inasmuch as the issue deals with the application of Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, rather than the "balancing of factors" analysis that might lead to an
l

"abuse-of-discretion" standard of review, State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah
App. 1993); Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor. Inc.. 871 P.2d 570, 572 (Utah App. 1994).
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by oral
objections raised by oral argument by counsel for Ms. Roundy (Tr. of proceedings of
May 9, 1997, at 13-22; Tr. of proceedings of May 13, 1997, at 6-10).
2,

Whether the District Court committed reversible error in denying

Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial based on "... surprise, which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against" under Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, inhering in Mr. Staley's said planned evidentiary presentation.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
The applicable standard with respect to this issue appears to be
whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion in denying the Motion for a
New Trial. Amoss v. Bennion. 517 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah 1973).
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by
Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial (R. at 916-17); by her Memorandum in Support of
that Motion (R. at 918-38); by her Reply Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R.
at 999-1000); and at oral argument on that Motion (Tr. of September 5, 1997
proceedings, at 6-21).
3.

Whether the District Court committed reversible error in denying

Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial based on "irregularity in the proceedings of the ...
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which [Ms. Roundy]
was prevented from having a fair trial/' under Rule 59(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
2

Procedure, inhering in Mr. Staley's said planned evidentiary presentation and the
District Court's said refusal to order disclosure thereof.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
The applicable standard with respect to this issue appears to be
whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion in denying the Motion for a
New Trial. Amoss v. Bennion. 517 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah 1973).
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by
Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial (R. at 916-17); by her Memorandum in Support of
that Motion (R. at 918-38); by her Reply Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R.
at 999-1000); and at oral argument on that Motion (Tr. of September 5, 1997
proceedings, at 6-21).
4±

Whether the District Court committed reversible error in denying

Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial based on the "[e]rror in law/' under Rule 59(a)(7)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, inhering in the District Court's said refusal to
order disclosure of Mr. Staley's planned surveillance video and related evidentiary
presentation.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
The applicable standard with respect to this issue appears to be
whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion in denying the Motion for a
New Trial. Amoss v. Bennion. 517 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah 1973).
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by
Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial (R. at 916-17); by her Memorandum in Support of
3

that Motion (R. at 918-38); by her Reply Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R.
at 999-1000); and at oral argument on that Motion (Tr. of September 5, 1997
proceedings, at 6-21).
5,

Whether the District Court committed reversible error in granting

Mr. Staley's Motion for Directed Verdict on Ms. Roundy's punitive damages claim.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this
issue appears to be whether there was any substantial evidence, or reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom, on which a reasonable jury could reach a verdict contrary to the
result sought by the motion. E.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799
(Utah 1991); Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988); Von Hake v. Thomas. 705
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985); Koer v. Mavfair Mkts. 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967);
Onveabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah App. 1990).
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings, by oral
argument (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings, at 91-97).
IH. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND HISTORY OF SIGNIFICANT
PROCEEDINGS IN DISTRICT COURT LITIGATION
On May 18, 1994, Laina Roundy, plaintiff-appellant, was, while driving
her Pontiac Bonneville, attempting to make a left turn from southbound Redwood Road
onto the eastbound 1-80 on-ramp in Salt Lake City. She pulled into the left turn lane
and waited for traffic to clear. She testified that she started her left turn just as the

4

light was turning from yellow to red (e.g., Tr. of May 13, 1997 proceedings, at 40) and
after several vehicles, proceeding northbound on Redwood Road, in the inside or
westernmore of the two lanes of through traffic, had stopped or slowed on the yellow
light (id. at 36). A Chevrolet Suburban, driven by Mr. Staley and proceeding in the
outside or easternmore of the two lanes of northbound Redwood Road, entered the
intersection at approximately 45 mph (e.g., Tr. of May 9, 1997 proceedings, at 94), and
collided with Ms. Roundy's car. Mr. Staley did not brake or take any evasive action
(e.g., Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings, at 83). The collision was nearly head-on.
Ms. Roundy's airbag deployed but she still sustained allegedly serious personal injuries.
Mr. Staley testified that the light had just turned yellow (Tr. of May 14, 1997
proceedings, at 102) when he entered the intersection, but no witness gave a fact-based
explanation for why several vehicles traveling in the direction Mr. Staley was traveling
would be slowing and stopping (Mr. Staley acknowledged that slowing and stopping to
be a fact — Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings, at 108-09) except in response to a yellow
light. Each driver's view of the other driver's vehicle was obscured by one or more
high-profile vehicles in that westernmore lane of northbound Redwood Road (e.g., Tr.
of May 13, 1997 proceedings, at 38; Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings, at 85).
Ms. Roundy brought this action seeking to recover for her injuries and
damages suffered, sustained, and incurred in the subject collision. She was originally
represented by her husband, Thor B. Roundy. When it became apparent that the case
was headed for trial, Ms. Roundy retained her present counsel.
During the jury selection process, counsel for Mr. Staley, in the course of
5

giving the names of witnesses he would call at trial, gave the name of one Ron
Gunderson as a possible "rebuttal" witness. Neither Ms. Roundy nor her counsel nor
anyone associated with her side of the case knew who Ron Gunderson was or what his
role in the case would be (e.g., Tr. of May 9, 1997 proceedings, at 13; Affidavit of
Peter C. Collins (R. at 941-44); Affidavit of John H. Burraston, III (R. at 945-47)).
Mr. Staley had not disclosed the existence of Mr. Gunderson or his proposed role in the
case or anything regarding the surveillance videotape, in response to Ms. Roundy's
discovery requests seeking pre-trial disclosure of trial witnesses and exhibits (R. at
1030-40). Approximately 7 1/2 months prior to trial, Ms. Roundy propounded, under
Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. at 1041), a request for supplementation of discovery responses. Even in response to that request, neither Ron
Gunderson's name nor his proposed involvement in the case was ever divulged prior to
trial. Nor was the existence of the surveillance video that was ultimately commented
on by defendant's witnesses and shown to the jury ever divulged or shown to
Ms. Roundy, or her counsel, prior to trial.
Shortly after Mr. Gunderson's name was first mentioned by Mr. Staley's
counsel, Ms. Roundy's counsel inquired of Mr. Staley's counsel regarding
Mr. Gunderson and inquiring, specifically, about the nature of his proposed involvement
in the case (Tr. of May 9, 1997 proceedings, at 13). Mr. Staley's counsel refused to
disclose the requested information (id.), and Ms. Roundy's counsel brought the matter
up with the District Court (id. at 13-22). In the course of argument on the matter,
Mr. Staley's counsel contended, among other things, that, because there was no court
6

order that all witnesses be disclosed, Mr. Staley and his counsel were under no
obligation to disclose Mr. Gunderson's identity or the subject matter of his proposed
testimony prior to trial and that (in the face of Ms. Roundy's counsel's contention that
Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required Mr. Staley to supplement his
responses to discovery requests when Ron Gunderson's possible involvement became
apparent to Mr. Staley's counsel) Ms. Roundy's remedy, if she was dissatisfied with
Mr. Staley's discovery responses, was to have filed a motion to compel prior to trial (id.
at 16). Counsel for Mr. Staley also contended that the District Court's requiring him to
divulge the role of Mr. Gunderson and his projected testimony would do away with
what he essentially acknowledged to be the surprise nature of the projected testimony
and that Mr. Gunderson's testimony would be used to show that Ms. Roundy was a liar
(id. at 17). The District Court, after expressing the view that it could conceive of
nothing more dramatic in a courtroom than a witness's being exposed as a liar (id. at
20), and apparently rejecting Ms. Roundy's counsel's responding contention that the
Rules make no exception for drama (id. at 20-21), denied Ms. Roundy's request that the
nature of Mr. Gunderson's proposed evidentiary presentation be disclosed (id. at 22).
Mr. Gunderson ultimately testified and played to the jury a surveillance
videotape that purported to show Ms. Roundy engaged in activities she purportedly told
the jury she could not do. Prior to the time that Mr. Gunderson testified and prior to
the time that the video was shown, Dr. Gerald Moress, defendant's "independent"
medical examination doctor and a very well-credentialed neurologist (Tr. of May 14,
1997 proceedings, at 6-9), who had prepared an independent medical evaluation
7

("IME") report setting forth his view that Ms. Roundy had suffered a 5% permanent
impairment (id. at 21) as a result of the subject motor vehicle collision, in essence
testified that, after rendering that impairment opinion, he had viewed the videotape and,
based on that viewing, had reason to question Ms. Roundy's veracity (id. at 22).l
Dr. Moress never supplemented his written IME report.
Ms. Roundy maintains that she was candid in her testimony and that the
videotape shows nothing different from what she testified to but acknowledges that the
jury may have viewed it differently, especially after having been told by as eminent an
authority as Dr. Moress, that it showed things contrary to what she had told him about.
The testimony of Mr. Gunderson and his surveillance videotape did not
deal with the issue of who had what percentage of fault in the subject collision, but, as
evidenced by Ms. Roundy's counsel's Affidavit (R. at 941-44) and the Affidavit of
Ms. Roundy's liability expert (R. at 945-47), submitted subsequent to trial, the concern
with the mysterious matter of Ron Gunderson considerably distracted Ms. Roundy's
team. Probably more importantly, Mr. Staley's counsel developed a central theme,
throughout the case, including in his closing argument (e.g., Tr. of May 15, 1997
proceedings, at 25-26; 40-41; 46-47), linking Ms. Roundy's supposed lack of credibility
with respect to the severity of her injuries with her supposed lack of credibility
regarding how the subject collision occurred. Because Ms. Roundy's testimony that the

*It was only during Dr. Moress's testimony, on direct examination, and not in
response to a question that signalled what was coming (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings, at 21-22), that Ms. Roundy and her counsel became aware of the existence of the
surveillance video.
8

light was red when Mr. Staley entered the intersection {e.g., Tr. of May 13, 1997
proceedings, at 40-41) was the only direct evidence on that crucial particular,2 her
credibility was central to her liability case.
At the conclusion of Ms. Roundy's case, Mr. Staley moved for directed
verdict (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings, at 92) on Ms. Roundy's punitive damages
claim. Even though evidence had been introduced that supported the proposition that
Mr. Staley, driving a heavy, truck-like vehicle, roared blindly into a busy intersection
on a light that had been red for as long as two seconds {e.g., Tr. of May 9, 1997
proceedings, at 105-08), or longer, the District Court granted that Motion (Tr. of May
14, 1997 proceedings, at 96).
The jury ultimately determined, by its Special Verdict (R. at 887-89), that
both Mr. Staley and Ms. Roundy were negligent and that the negligence of each of
them was a proximate cause of Ms. Roundy's injuries. The jury also determined (id.),
having been instructed that if Ms. Roundy should be adjudged to have had 50% or
more of the causal fault she would recover nothing (R. at 855), that Mr. Staley had
40% of the causal fault and that Ms. Roundy had 60% of the causal fault, and answered
none of the questions regarding Ms. Roundy's damages.
The District Court then entered judgment, on the verdict, in favor of
Mr. Staley (R. at 907-09).

2

In his opening statement, Mr. Staley's counsel himself stated: "So it's going to be
a question of what color the light was and exactly how this transpired." Second Tr. of
May 8, 1997 proceedings, at 23.
9

Ms. Roundy then filed her Motion for a New Trial (R. at 916-17),
contending that she was entitled to a new trial on alternative bases including the
following:
1.

''Irregularity in the proceedings of the court ... or adverse party, or

any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which [Ms. Roundy] was prevented
from having a fair trial" (Rule 59(a)(1));
2.

"Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have

guarded against" (Rule 59(a)(3));
3.

"Error in law" (Rule 59(a)(7)).

The District Court denied that Motion (R. at 1054-56), and this Appeal
ensued.
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
L

The District Court committed reversible error in refusing to order

counsel for Mr. Staley to disclose the planned surveillance video and related evidentiary
presentation.
2±

The District Court abused its discretion and committed reversible

error by denying Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial based on "... surprise, which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against," under Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, inhering in Dr. Moress's testimony regarding the surveillance
videotape, in Mr. Gunderson's testimony regarding the surveillance videotape, and in
the surveillance videotape itself.
3.

The District Court abused its discretion and committed reversible
10

error by denying Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial based on "irregularity in the
proceedings of the ... adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by
which [Ms. Roundy] was prevented from having a fair trial," under Rule 59(a)(1) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, with such irregularity and abuse of discretion having to
do with Mr. Staley's counsel's refusing to disclose, in timely fashion, the surveillance
video and related evidence, and the District Court's countenancing that non-disclosure.
4.

The District Court abused its discretion and committed reversible

error by denying Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial based on the District Court's
"[ejrror in law," under Rule 59(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, inhering in
the District Court's refusal to order disclosure of Mr. Staley's planned surveillance video
and related evidentiary presentation.
5^

The District Court committed error in granting Mr. Staley's Motion

for Directed Verdict on Ms. Roundy's punitive damages claim.
V.
A.

ARGUMENT

MR. STALEY'S COUNSEL FAILED TO ADHERE TO THE RULES
IN REFUSING TO DISCLOSE HIS PLANNED EVIDENTIARY
PRESENTATION, THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO ORDER DISCLOSURE,
AND MS. ROUNDY IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL UNDER
EITHER THE "DE NOVO' STANDARD OF REVIEW OR THE
"ABUSE-OF-DISCRETION" STANDARD OF REVIEW.
JL

PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As this Court will readily observe, the first four of the five aspects
(presented immediately hereinabove) of Ms. Roundy's argument are interrelated. They

11

all deal with the conduct of Mr. Staley's counsel in refusing to disclose Mr. Staley's
planned evidentiary presentation regarding the surveillance video and the District
Court's countenancing that conduct.
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
(e)

Supplementation of responses- A party who has responded to a
request for discovery with a response that was complete when
made is under no duty to supplement his response to include
information thereafter acquired, except as follows:
(1)

A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his
response with respect to any question directly addressed to
(A) the identity and location of persons having knowledge of
discoverable matters, and (B) the identity of each person
expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject
matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance
of his testimony.

(2)

A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he obtains information upon the basis of which
(A) he knows that the response was incorrect when made,
or (B) he knows that the response though correct when made
is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a
failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing
concealment.

(3)

A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of
the court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to
trial through new requests for supplementation of prior
responses.

On or about October 19, 1994, Ms. Roundy propounded Plaintiffs' First
Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Things and Requests
for Admission to Defendants. In that request Ms. Roundy included detailed definitions
pertinent to the discovery requests at issue. Comprehensive definitions of the terms
12

"document" and "identify" appear in the Addendum hereto, at 2-4. Mr. Staley's
pertinent responses to those discovery requests are the following (also reproduced in the
Addendum hereto), at 6-8:
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all witnesses you intend to call on
your behalf at trial on this matter. Include in your answer a brief
summary of their proposed testimony.
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for
defendant has not yet made decisions about which witnesses may be
called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the court's order
for designating witnesses at the time designated by the court. Without
waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this time that defense counsel
will call: Plaintiffs, Defendants Neil Staley and Travis Staley, Melodie
Kraft, Officer Hawk, Maryann Jiminez, expert witnesses as yet undetermined and undoubtedly others.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify all individuals who may have
information concerning the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint and
Defendant's Answer. Include in your answer a brief summary of the
information which they may have.
ANSWER: Plaintiff would best know who has information about their
Complaint. As to defendants' Answer, Objection: the Answer was
prepared by counsel, and it is the product of counsel's mental impressions
and legal analysis; as such the information requested is protected as work
product pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). As to the
general subject matter of this litigation, plaintiffs, defendants Neil Staley
and Travis Staley, Officer Hawk, Melodie Kraft, Maryann Jiminez,
plaintiffs' treating physicians and undoubtedly others.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify all individuals you plan to use as
expert witnesses at trial in this matter. Include in your answer a copy of
their resume or curriculum vitae, and a brief summary of their proposed
testimony.
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for
defendant has not yet made decisions about expert witnesses that may be
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called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the court's order
for designating witnesses at the time designated by the court. Without
waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this time that defense counsel
will call an accident reconstructionist, one or more medical experts, who
are undetermined at this time, and one or more medical experts who will
perform Independent Medical Examinations; other experts may likely be
called as well.

INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all documents (in the detail required
by "Definitions" paragraph 5, above) you intend to use on your behalf at
trial on this matter.
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for
defendant has not yet made decisions about which exhibits may be used at
trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the court's order for
providing exhibits or exhibit lists at the time designated by the court.
On or about September 25, 1996, Ms. Roundy propounded her Rule 26(e)
Request for Supplementation (reproduced in the Addendum hereto, at 9). Mr. Staley
responded as follows (also reproduced in the Addendum hereto, at 10-12):
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all witnesses you intend to call on
your behalf at trial on this matter. Include in your answer a brief
summary of their proposed testimony.
ANSWER: Counsel for defendant has not yet made decisions about
which witnesses may be called at trial. Counsel for defendant will
comply with the court's order for designating witnesses at the time
designated by the court. Without waiving that objection, it is anticipated
at this time that defense counsel will call: Laina Roundy, Travis Staley,
Melodie Kraft, Officer Hawk, Maryann Jiminez, Anita Sachez and
undoubtedly others.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify all individuals you plan to use as
expert witnesses at trial in this matter. Include in your answer a copy of
their resume or curriculum vitae, and a brief summary of their proposed
14

testimony.
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for
defendant has not yet made decisions about expert witnesses that may be
called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the court's order
for designating witnesses at the time designated by the court. Without
waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this time that defense counsel
will call an Ronald L. Probert, accident reconstructionist, Gerald Moress
M.D., and other experts may likely be called as well.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all documents (in the detail required
by "Definitions" paragraph 5, above) you intend to use on your behalf at
trial on this matter.
ANSWER: Discovery is on-going and counsel for defendant has not yet
made decisions about which exhibits may be used at trial. Counsel for
defendant will comply with the court's order for providing exhibits or
exhibit lists at the time designated by the court. Without waiving that
objection, defendant may use the following exhibits at trial: A diagram of
the accident scene involved in the subject accident; Defendant may use a
computer animation/recreation of the subject accident; Photographs of the
accident scene; Portions of plaintiffs medical records and medical
expenses, including extracts and summaries of such; Copies, redacted as
necessary, of the investigating officer's reports, diagrams and statements;
Photographs of the defendant's vehicle; Photographs of the plaintiffs
vehicle; Repair records of the parties' vehicles; Income, benefits and
employment records of plaintiff, including extracts and summaries of
such; IME reports; Experts' reports; Defendant reserves the right to submit
additional exhibits obtained from materials in conjunction with formal
discovery in this matter; Defendant reserves the right to submit additional
exhibits as needed for rebuttal of plaintiffs claims; Defendant reserves the
right to submit additional exhibits prepared between the date of this
Supplemental Answer to Interrogatories and the date of trial.
That was the status of things at the commencement of trial.
Z

TRIAL DEVELOPMENTS

The pertinent trial developments are detailed, hereinabove, at pages 5-9,
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and Ms. Roundy incorporates, by this reference, that history. The colloquy, argument,
and District Court ruling on the Ron Gunderson Mystery are reproduced in the
Addendum hereto, at 14-22, and those things are, by this reference, incorporated herein.
Suffice it to say, in the interest of refraining from repetition, that Ms. Roundy and her
counsel knew nothing about Mr. Gunderson and his planned role in the case, or about
any surveillance video, until Dr. Moress (Mr. Staley's ,,independent,/ medical examiner)
mentioned the surveillance video in the course of a lengthy narrative (Tr. of May 14,
1997 proceedings, at 20-22) in response to a question that did not signal the impending
dropping of the bombshell. At that point, "the cat was out of the bag," and
Ms. Roundy and her counsel had to deal with the surprise nature of the testimony as
well as they could.
1

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Mr. Staley's counsel had a duty, under Rule 26(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, especially in the face of Ms. Roundy's Request for Supplementation, to
disclose Mr. Gunderson's role, the existence of the videotape, and the fact that
Dr. Moress would make reference to the videotape in his testimony. Mr. Staley's
contention that Ms. Roundy had a duty to proceed by a Motion to Compel, when she
had no inkling of the nature of the evidence whose disclosure she would be seeking to
compel,3 is sophistry. Nor can Mr. Staley's counsel rest comfortably, in the face of

3

It may be of interest that Mr. Staley's counsel himself expressed the view (Tr. of
proceedings of May 13, 1997, at 9-10) that it is unlikely that a Motion to Compel
would have been granted.
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Ms. Roundy's discovery requests and Request for Supplementation, on his contention
that he was excused from providing substantive discovery responses by the fact that
there was no separate court order mandating the disclosure of witnesses.
Furthermore, Mr. Staley's contention that the evidence was ,/rebuttal,/
evidence misapprehends the nature of "rebuttal" evidence. A "rebuttal" case is a case
that a plaintiff puts on after the defendant's case. A "rebuttal" argument is argument
that a plaintiffs lawyer makes after the defendant's lawyer has completed his or her
argument. And "rebuttal" evidence is typically evidence that a plaintiff puts on to rebut
a defendant's evidence.
Mr. Staley's counsel had taken two depositions of Ms. Roundy, the second
one very shortly before the trial and limited to inquiry regarding Ms. Roundy's thenpresent condition. Mr. Staley knew, in essence, through his counsel, what Ms. Roundy
was going to say at trial about her physical condition and has never contended that he
was surprised by any supposed change between her deposition testimony and her trial
testimony.
If Mr. Staley's position is taken to its logical conclusion, a defendant
could get away, in a virtually limitless number of situations, with non-disclosure of
planned evidentiary presentation, simply by calling his evidence "rebuttal" evidence
and, given the defendant's own purported view of truth and falsity, take the position
that that evidence would only be used if necessary to expose any witness as a "liar."
The defendant would then be dictating the rules of discovery, and that is precisely what
the District Court in this case allowed to happen. That cannot be the law.
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Cases from Utah and from other jurisdictions express strong disapproval
for the trial-by-ambush strategy employed by Mr. Staley and countenanced by the
District Court.
In Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1023-24 (Utah 1994), a case in
which the witness in question was the plaintiffs "rebuttal" witness, the Utah Supreme
Court observed:
... disclosure [of all potential witnesses in advance of trial] ... serves a
number of significant purposes.... It gives both parties the opportunity to
prepare adequately for trial, including, among other things, deposing
witnesses, investigating witnesses' testimony, and preparing an effective
cross-examination.... It also encourages the parties to make a serious
effort to investigate the facts and discover all relevant witnesses in a
timely manner. Finally, it furthers the orderly and efficient administration
of justice by avoiding delays which might otherwise be necessary to
accommodate the need to prepare for a surprise witness.... When the
offering party contends that the undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut
the adverse party's evidence, the issue hinges on whether the evidence
"sought to be rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to
trial."
Here there is no doubt that Ms. Roundy's testimony about her physical condition and
limitations was "reasonably anticipated prior to trial."
In Lascano v. Vowell 940 P.2d 977 (Colo. App. 1996), the appellate
court held it to reversible error for the trial court to delay ruling on, and ultimately to
allow, the admission of a late-designated defense surveillance video. Among the
reasons given by that court for its ruling was that the "plaintiff was placed at a
significant disadvantage by having to rebut the exhibit without sufficient time to
prepare properly." M a t 981.
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In Dodson v. Persell, 390 So.2d 704, 705-07 (Fla. 1980), the court, in the
course of reversing for new trial, held that the existence and contents of surveillance
films to be used as evidence are discoverable and observed that pertinent discovery
rules were adopted to eliminate prejudice inhering in the surprise disclosure of
evidence.
In Perez-Perez v. Popular Leasing Rental, Inc., 993 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.
1993), the First Circuit reversed a judgment on a jury verdict, holding that the trial
court's admission of an undisclosed witness's testimony was an abuse of discretion.
There the court observed:
Without time to review [the witness's] records ... or arrange for a rebuttal
expert, ... counsel was precluded from effectively addressing the charge.
We have no doubt that this state of the record exactly comports
with the definition of unfair surprise succinctly set out by the Court
of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit:
It is well settled that Rule 59 provides a means of relief in cases in
which a party has been made the victim of surprise. The surprise,
however, must be inconsistent with ... substantial justice in order to
justify a grant of a new trial....
In Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), the Tenth
Circuit reversed a judgment on a jury verdict and, in the course of determining that the
trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony of an undisclosed witness,
observed:
The failure of a party to comply with discovery requests under rule 26 has
led to findings of prejudice resulting in the exclusion of the proffered
evidence. Coleco Industries, Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert, denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 106, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978);
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Tabatchnick v. G. D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49 (D.N.J. 1975).
Similarly, although district courts enjoy wide discretion in handling
discovery and pretrial matters, Phil Crowley Steel Corp. v. Macomber,
Inc., 601 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979), reversible error has been found in
allowing testimony without such discovery where there has been a "gross
abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the
case." Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 96 (8th Cir. 1977); Shelak v.
White Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1978); Weiss v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1975).
626 F.2d at 794.
It cannot be seriously contended by Mr. Staley that the District Court did
not commit error in refusing to order disclosure. Nor can it be seriously contended that
Ms. Roundy and her counsel were not "surprised" or that "ordinary prudence" could
have "guarded against" that surprise. Nor can it be seriously contended that the nondisclosure and/or the District Court's countenancing that non-disclosure did not amount
to "irregularity in the proceedings of the adverse party, or any order of the court, or
abuse of discretion by which [Ms. Roundy] was prevented from having a fair trial."
Nor can it be seriously contended that the District Court's refusal to order disclosure did
not amount to an "[e]rror in law."
Whether the focus of this Court's analysis is appropriately on the first
designated issue on appeal (pages 1-2 hereinabove), calling for a de novo standard of
review, or on any of the next three designated issues (pages 2-4 hereinabove), calling
for an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, or on some combination of those issues,
the outcome of the analysis should be the same: the District Court clearly erred in
countenancing the non-disclosure, the non-disclosure was most "irregular"; the non-
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disclosure and the District Court's countenancing it prevented Ms. Roundy from
receiving a fair trial; and the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to order a
new trial.
B.

NEITHER MR. STALEY'S COUNSELS CONDUCT NOR THE
DISTRICT COURTS REFUSAL TO ORDER DISCLOSURE WAS
"HARMLESS."
Ms. Roundy is, through her counsel, well aware of the "harmless error"

aspect of the law that is embodied in Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
that is expressly referenced in Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On the
facts of this case, this Court should determine, in the words of Rule 61, that "refusal [to
order a new trial]" would be "inconsistent with substantial justice."
Ms. Roundy acknowledges that a superficial review of the jury's verdict
would cause any law-trained person to conclude that any error or irregularity in the
proceedings having to do with the surveillance video and related evidence should be
considered harmless. After all, that evidence dealt only with Ms. Roundy's damages —
or the lack thereof — and the jury never got to damages on the Special Verdict. When
it found that Ms. Roundy had 60% of the causal fault, its job was done. And it knew
that to be the case. So, one asks, why was the District Court's error not harmless?
And why were the irregularities of Mr. Staley's counsel not harmless?
The answer can be found, as suggested hereinabove, at page 8, in
Mr. Staley's counsel's entire approach to the defense of this case. The liability issue in
this case, when stripped to its essence, came down to the question of whether the traffic
light was red when Mr. Staley's Suburban entered the intersection. Mr. Staley's counsel
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essentially acknowledged that to be the case in his opening statement (Second Tr. of
May 8, 1997 proceedings, at 23). For if, as Ms. Roundy testified, the light turned red4
just as she started her turn, and if, as the experts agreed (e.g., Tr. of May 14, 1997
proceedings, at 164, 192 (Mr. Staley's expert testifying)), it took 2.4 seconds to 3.1
seconds from the time Ms. Roundy began her turn until impact occurred, the light was
"cold red" when Mr. Staley entered the intersection, and no reasonable jury could have
found that Ms. Roundy had, if any fault, more fault than Mr. Staley had.
As pointed out hereinabove, at pages 8-9, Ms. Roundy is the only witness
who testified that the light was definitely red when Mr. Staley's Suburban entered the
intersection. Her credibility thus became crucial to the success of her liability case.
And, as explained hereinabove, at page 8, in his closing argument Mr. Staley's counsel
played Ms. Roundy's supposed lack of credibility on the damages issue ~ as supposedly
proved by the surveillance video — (Exhibit 23-D) for all it was supposedly worth, in
connection with his argument on the liability issue. The most pertinent parts of that
argument are reproduced in the Addendum hereto, at 25-30.
The jury had been instructed (R. at 855; p. 32 of Addendum hereto) that
Ms. Roundy would recover nothing if she was found to have 50% or more of the causal
fault. The jury had also been instructed (R. at 849; p. 31 of Addendum hereto) that if
the jury believed that any witness (including Ms. Roundy) had willfully testified falsely

4

Lest there be any uncertainty, the light for Ms. Roundy was, at all pertinent times,
the same color as was the light for Mr. Staley (Tr. of May 9, 1997 proceedings, at 7879).
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as to any material matter (including, by implication, the severity of her injuries), the
jury could disregard her entire testimony, except as corroborated by other, credible
testimony. Mr. Staley's counsel (Tr. of May 15, 1997 proceedings, at 26; Addendum at
26) hammered on that instruction in his closing argument, and there was no solid
corroborating evidence that the light was red when Mr. Staley's Suburban entered the
intersection.
The link between Ms. Roundy's supposed lack of credibility on damages
and liability issues and the significance of that supposed lack of credibility, founded
substantially on the surprise surveillance video and Dr. Moress's surprise testimony
regarding it, and the significance of that link to the jury's defense liability verdict is
thus established.
What, then, of the question of what Ms. Roundy could have done with the
surveillance video if she had been allowed to learn of its existence and that of its
"author" and had been allowed to view it in perfectly timely fashion (or even when the
issue was raised with the District Court on the second day of trial)? The list in
response is long. The following are examples only. Her counsel could have, in the
universally recognized crucial trial phase of opening statement, discussed it (if it had,
indeed, survived a motion in limine). Her counsel could have deposed Mr. Gunderson
to learn of the details of its taking. Her counsel could have interrogated Mr. Gunderson
regarding its editing and the other details of the production process and thereby
determined how realistic and full and accurate a picture it gave. Her counsel could
have explored the nature of Mr. Gunderson's background and his working with
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Mr. Staley's counsel. Her counsel could have prepared better cross-examinations of
Dr. Moress and Mr. Gunderson. She would have had time (there was a weekend
between the time of the Ron Gunderson discussion with the District Court and the time
of Dr. Moress's testimony and the conclusion of the trial) to locate the exact fake
"potted plant" depicted in the video and bring it to the courtroom so the jury could feel
how light it really was. She could have had her very friend who is depicted in the
video come to testify about her weakened condition. She could have been prepared to
explain what was going on in her life and the "kind of day" she was having while the
video was being taken. And her counsel could have moved, with, perhaps, success,
under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, for exclusion of the video and all
references to it by reason of such things as its prejudicial and confusing {e.g., fake
plant) nature.
The fact that we live in a video-intensive age needs no citation of
authority. A jury that had spent several trial days dealing with essentially verbal
evidentiary presentations, from both sides, would be expected to pay special heed to a
"cloak-and-dagger" video investigative product. Mr. Staley's counsel played all this for
all it was worth, and more. And the District Court itself (Tr. of May 15, 1997
proceedings, at 228) suggested turning off the lights in the courtroom. The significance
of this surprise evidence, and of Dr. Moress's surprise reference to it, cannot be
overstated, and neither Mr. Staley's counsel's conduct nor the District Court's countenancing that conduct was "harmless."
If this Court should grant Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial, it will not
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be the first time that an appellate court has determined reversible, liability-case error to
inhere in what appears, on superficial review, to be error that would deal only with
damages issues. In Green v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 59 F.3d 1029,
1033-34 (10th Cir. 1995), the Tenth Circuit reversed a judgment on a no-liability jury
verdict in a situation where the trial court erroneously allowed evidence of collateral
source payments to come to the jury's attention. The link there recognized —
The major reason for excluding collateral source evidence is the concern
that juries will be more likely to find no liability if they know that
plaintiff has received some compensation.
Id. at 1033 — especially when there was no apparent attempt by the defendant's counsel
there (unlike here) to link damages issues with liability issues, seems considerably
weaker, if anything, than the link here.
The non-disclosure was not harmless, the District Court's refusal to order
disclosure was not harmless, and Ms. Roundy is entitled to a new trial.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING
MR. STALEYS MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM.
Ms. Roundy's punitive damages claim was based on the proposition that

Mr. Staley acted, in the language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1, with a knowing and
reckless disregard toward, and a conscious disregard of, the rights of others, if, as
Ms. Roundy contends is the fact, he drove his Suburban, with his vision obstructed,
into a busy intersection against a traffic light that had been red for approximately two
seconds, or longer.
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Ms. Roundy had the facts and the law to keep her punitive damages claim
in the case, and the District Court erred in granting Mr. Staley's Motion for Directed
Verdict on that claim. Ms. Roundy acknowledges that if she does not succeed in this
Appeal on one or more of the grounds set forth hereinabove, the issue will be moot,
but, confident of the proposition that this Court will reverse and remand for new trial
on one or more of the issues discussed hereinabove, Ms. Roundy urges this Court to
include, in its remand order, a directive to the District Court to enable her to proceed,
in that new trial, with her punitive damages claim.
The standard for imposition of punitive damages is set forth in Utah Code
Ann. §78-18-1:
. . . conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
That Utah statute appears to codify, verbatim, the holding of this Court in Gleave v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co.. 749 P.2d 660, 670 (Utah App. 1988) (citing
three Utah Supreme Court cases). In Gleave, this Court, in discussing the trial court's
granting of the defendant's motion for directed verdict on the punitive damages claim,
applied an analysis that fits every directed verdict context:
If . . . reasonable inferences supporting judgment for the [party
resisting the directed verdict motion] could be drawn from the
evidence presented at trial, the directed verdict cannot be sustained
[Utah Supreme Court citations omitted]. This is so even if reasonable persons might reach different conclusions on the punitive
damages issue after considering the evidence and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom.
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Id. (emphasis added).
There are, undeniably, as is clear from the foregoing quotation from
Gleave, cases in which it is appropriate for the jury to determine whether punitive
damages should be awarded. The instant case is one such case. On Ms. Roundy's
version of the liability facts of this case, the jury could well have determined and could
in a new trial well determine, pursuant to the clear and convincing evidence standard of
proof applicable to punitive damages claims, that Mr. Staley acted with "knowing and
reckless indifference toward and disregard of the rights of others/' including
Ms. Roundy. Perhaps the jury will not in the new trial so find, but it is certainly a
question on which reasonable minds could differ, under Ms. Roundy's version of the
facts.
Utah law allows Utah jurors — if there is some substantial basis that takes
the case, as a matter for reasonable jury determination, outside the realm of mere inadvertence or mistake, or the "ordinary" run of cases, and when they are appropriately
instructed on the statutory requirement for imposition of punitive damages — to make
the determination of whether an award of punitive damages is appropriate. If
Mr. Staley made a decision — something a jury would reasonably conclude to have
occurred — to drive into a busy intersection, on a red light, when his view of turning
vehicles, like Ms. Roundy's, was obstructed, a jury should be allowed to decide whether
that conduct is egregious enough to lead to the imposition of punitive damages.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Ms. Roundy urges this Court to reverse
and remand, for new trial, on one or more of the grounds discussed hereinabove, and
also to reverse the District Court's granting of Mr. Staley's Motion for Directed Verdict
on Ms. Roundy's punitive damages claim.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^W&ay of November, 1998.

PETER C. COLLINS
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, Laina
Roundy
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P.O. Box 2465
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ADDENDUM

Kyle W. Jones (Bar No. 1744)
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 2650
3 6 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 359-7771
Thor B. Roundy (Bar No. 643 5)
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs
660 South 200 East, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 364-3229
Facsimile (801) 355-5080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAINA ROUNDY, an individual,
THOR ROUNDY, an individual,
and LAINA ROUNDY, as guardian
ad litem for ANASTASIA ROUNDY,
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS7 FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
AND THINGS AND REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS

v.
NEIL STALEY, an individual,
and TRAVIS STALEY, an
individual,
Civil No. 940906068CV
Defendants.
Judge David S. Young
Plaintiffs Thor and Laina and Anastasia Roundy ("Roundys"), by
and through their undersigned counsel, hereby submit to Defendants
Travis

Staley

and

Neil

Staley,

Plaintiffs'

First

Set

of

Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests
for Admissions pursuant to the provisions of Rules 26, 33, 34, and
3 6 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Roundys demand that

the aforementioned Defendants respond to each Interrogatory and
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Request

for

Admission

under

oath

and

produce

the

documents

designated below that are in their possession, custody or control
and do so at the law offices of Thor B. Roundy, 660 South 200 East,
Suite 425, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 or at such other place as is
mutually agreeable to counsel for the parties and to produce the
things designated at such place as is mutually agreeable to counsel
for the parties, within thirty

(30) days of the date of service

hereof. Pursuant to Rule 36, the Request for Admissions shall be
deemed admitted unless such requests are responded to within thirty
(30) days of the service of such requests.

Upon such production,

the Roundys further request that the aforementioned

Defendants

permit the inspection and/or copying of the documents produced.
DEFINITIONS
The following definitions

shall be used herein except as

indicated to the contrary:
1.

The terms "you" and "your" refer to Travis Staley

and Neil Staley.
To the extent that the answers of each defendant would differ,
provide a separate answer for each defendant.
2.

The term "document" or "documents" as used herein

shall mean the originals and all nonidentical

copies

(whether

different from the originals because of any alterations, notes,
comments, or other material contained therein or attached thereto
or otherwise) and drafts of all written, printed, recorded or
graphic matter of every kind and description, together with any
thor\staley\discover\lrr
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attachment thereto or enclosure therewith, in any way relating or
referring to or concerning the subject matter of the request,
whether

inscribed

or

mechanical,

electronic,

microfilm,

photographic or by other means as well as all phonic or visual
reproductions, including but not limited to: diaries, contracts,
drafts,

manuals,

schedules,

reports,

tabulations,

telegrams,

tallies,

notes,

charts,

compilations,

tables,

diagrams,

drawings, interoffice and intra-office memoranda, memoranda for
file, minutes
registration

of meetings, photocopies,
statements,

registration

circulars, pamphlets,

documents,

memoranda

of

telephonic conversations, memoranda of meetings and conferences,
correspondence, accounting records, computer-stored data or data
bases, or computer printouts or programs, or any other documents
such as a code for a computer run or printout, tape recordings of
any statement or conversation, and any other retrievable data in
your possession, custody or control as known to you, wherever
located, including documents in the possession of any of your
current

or

former

agents,

attorneys,

accountants,

servants,

employers or employees.
3.

The term "person" or "persons" shall mean the plural

as well as the singular and shall include any natural person and
any firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal
entity.
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4.

The term "identify," in any of its various forms,

when used in referring to persons, as defined above, shall mean and
require you to state with regard to each person so designated:
(a)

the name of the person;

(b)

the person's present (or last known) business

and home address;
(c)

the person's present (or last known) employer;

(d)

the person's title and duties of each position

held with that employer.
5.

The term "identify," in any of its various forms,

when used in relationship to the term "document" or "documents"
shall

require

you

to

state

with

regard

to

each

document

so

(a)

the title and date appearing on the document;

designated:

and the date of the document's preparation, if known;
(b)

a description of the document in sufficient

detail to enable it to be specifically identified;
(c)

the

name(s),

address(es)

and

title(s)

(if

known) of the author(s) and signer(s) of the document;
(d)

the name(s) and business address(es) of the

persons presently having custody of the original document (and
of any copies thereof of which you have knowledge);
(e)

the name(s) and business address(es) of each

person having knowledge of any factual assertions reflected in
such documents;
thor\staley\discover\lrr
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LYNN S. DAVIES [A0824]
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON [A5771]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 So. Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.:
(801) 532-5506
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAINA ROUNDY, an individual,
THOR ROUNDY, an individual,
and LAINA ROUNDY as guardian
ad litem for ANASTASIA ROUNDY,

DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 940906068
vs.
Judge David S. Young
NEIL STALEY, an individual,
and TRAVIS STALEY, an
individual,
Defendants.

j

Defendants Neil Staley and Travis Staley hereby answer
Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories as follows:
GENERAL OBJECTION:

Plaintiffs' Interrogatories are

excessively long and unduly burdensome.

They are also violative

of the provisions of Rule 26(b), second paragraph, items (i)(iii).

Insofar as the Interrogatories relate to the Complaint,

the Complaint itself was unduly long and burdensome.
INTERROGATORY NO. l:

State the name of every person

who contributes to your answers to these discovery requests.

For

1030
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each person, state the address and telephone number where they
live and state every other address and telephone number at which
they can be reached.
ANSWER:

Defendants Neil Staley and Travis Staley, and

their attorney, Lynn S. Davies and his staff at Richards, Brandt,
Miller & Nelson.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Identify all witnesses you

intend to call on your behalf at trial on this matter.

Include

in your answer a brief summary of their proposed testimony.
ANSWER;

OBJECTION.

Discovery is on-going and counsel

for defendant has not yet made decisions about which witnesses
may be called at trial.

Counsel for defendant will comply with

the court's order for designating witnesses at the time
designated by the court.

Without waiving that objection, it is

anticipated at this time that defense counsel will call:
Plaintiffs, Defendants Neil Staley and Travis Staley, Melodie
Kraft, Officer Hawk, Maryann Jimenez, expert witnesses as yet
undetermined and undoubtedly others.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Identify all individuals who may

have information concerning the allegations of Plaintiffs'
Complaint or Defendant's Answer.

Include in your answer a brief

summary of the information which they may have.
ANSWER:

Plaintiffs would best know who has information

about their Complaint.

0006

As to defendants' Answer, Objection:

the

Ib

Answer was prepared by counsel, and it is the product of
counsel's mental impressions and legal analysis; as such the
information requested is protected as work product pursuant to
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).

As to the general subject

matter of this litigation, plaintiffs, defendants Neil Staley and
Travis Staley, Officer Hawk, Melodie Kraft, Maryann Jimenez,
plaintiffs' treating physicians and undoubtedly others,
INTERROGATORY NO, 4:

Identify all individuals you

plan to use as expert witnesses at trial in this matter.

Include

in your answer a copy of their resume or curriculum vitae, and a
brief summary of their proposed testimony.
ANSWER:

OBJECTION.

Discovery is on-going and counsel

for defendant has not yet made decisions about expert witnesses
that may be called at trial.

Counsel for defendant will comply

with the court's order for designating witnesses at the time
designated by the court.

Without waiving that objection, it is

anticipated at this time that defense counsel will call an
accident reconstructionist, one or more medical experts, who are
undetermined at this time, and one or more medical experts who
will perform Independent Medical Examinations; other experts may
likely be called as well.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

Identify all individuals you

have consulted as experts but do not plan to use on your behalf
3
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at a trial on this matter.

Include in your answer a copy of

their resume or curriculum vitae.
ANSWER:

Objection - such information is protected as

work product pursuant to URCP 26(b)(3).

Without waiving that

objection, there are no such experts at this time.
INTERROGATORY NO, 6:

Identify all documents (in the

detail required by "Definitions" paragraph 5, above) you intend
to use on your behalf at a trial on this matter.
ANSWER:

OBJECTION.

Discovery is on-going and counsel

for defendant has not yet made decisions about which exhibits may
be used at trial.

Counsel for defendant will comply with the

court / s order for providing exhibits or exhibit lists at the time
designated by the court.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7;

Identify all documents (in the

detail required by "Definitions11 paragraph 5, above) which may
contain information concerning the allegations of Plaintiffs'
Complaint and/or Defendant's Answer.

Include in your answer, but

do not limit it to, an identification of all individuals with
information concerning your response.
ANSWER:
3.

See Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No.

Without waiving that Objection, see Salt Lake Police

Department Accident Investigation Report No. 94-65770.

4
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Peter C. Collins (#0700)
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C«
4021 South 700 East, #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 2 65-1888
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAINA ROUNDY,
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 2 6(e)
REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTATION

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 940906068CV

TRAVIS STALEY,

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.

Plaintiff Laina Roundy (the only remaining plaintiff in
this case), by and through her lawyers, requests that defendant,
pursuant to Rule 2 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
specifically in response to this Request, supplement his responses
to all Interrogatories and all Requests for Production of Documents
previously submitted to defendant by plaintiff.
DATED this

Z~-

day q£)September, 199 6.

PEtfER C. COLLINS
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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LYNNS.DAVIES [A0824]
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON [A5771]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 So. Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801)531-2000
Fax No.: (801)532-5506
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LAINA ROUNDY, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL
ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES

TRAVIS STALEY, an individual,
Defendants.

Civil No. 940906068
Judge David S. Young

Defendant Travis Staley hereby provides Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs
First Set of Interrogatories as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all witnesses you intend to call on your
behalf at trial on this matter. Include in your answer a brief summary of their proposed
testimony.

0010
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ANSWER:

Counsel for defendant has not yet made decisions about which

witnesses may be called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the court's order for
designating witnesses at the time designated by the court. Without waiving that objection, it is
anticipated at this time that defense counsel will call: Laina Roundy, Travis Staley, Melodie
Kraft, Officer Hawk, Maryann Jimenez, Anita Sachez and undoubtedly others.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify all individuals you plan to use as expert
witnesses at trial in this matter. Include in your answer a copy of their resume or curriculum
vitae, and a brief summary of their proposed testimony.
ANSWER:

OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for defendant

has not yet made decisions about expert witnesses that may be called at trial. Counsel for
defendant will comply with the court's order for designating witnesses at the time designated by
the court. Without waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this time that defense counsel will
call an Ronald L. Probert, accident ^constructionist, Gerald Moress M.D., and other experts
may likely be called as well.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all documents (in the detail required by
"Definitions'1 paragraph 5, above) you intend to use on your behalf at a trial on this matter.
ANSWER:

Discovery is on-going and counsel for defendant has not yet made

decisions about which exhibits may be used at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the
court's order for providing exhibits or exhibit lists at the time designated by the court. Without
waiving that objection, defendant may use the following exhibits at trial:

A diagram of the

accident scene involved in the subject accident; Defendant may use a computer

1
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animation/recreation of the subject accident; Photographs of the accident scene; Portions of
plaintiffs medical records and medical expenses, including extracts and summaries of such;
Copies, redacted as necessary, of the investigating police officer's reports, diagrams and
statements; Photographs of the defendant's vehicle; Photographs of the plaintiffs vehicle;
Repair records for the parties' vehicles; Income, benefits and employment records of plaintiff,
including extracts and summaries of such; IME reports; Experts' reports; Defendant reserves the
right to submit additional exhibits obtained from materials supplied in conjunction with formal
discovery in this matter; Defendant reserves the right to submit additional exhibits as needed for
rebuttal of plaintiffs claims; Defendant reserves the right to submit additional exhibits prepared
between the date of this Supplemental Answer to Interrogatories and the date of trial.
DATED this

day of November, 1996.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

.YNN S. DAVIES
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
--00O00--

LAINA ROUNDY and THOR
ROUNDY,
Civil No. 940906068 CV
Judge David S. Young

Plaintiffs,
vs .
NEIL STALEY and TRAVIS
STALEY,
Defendants.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
MAY 9, 19 97
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG

CERTIFIED COPY

REPORTED BY TIFFANY WALTERS, CSR, RPR

1

about that yesterday.

2

police officer, he was able to conclude

3

things something about the speed, plus the fact

4

he will testify that the man sped up to beat the

5

light.

That's an important underlying

6
7

THE C O U R T :

I'll

from

those
that

basis.

let that fact in, but the

condition of the l i g h t , he can't testify to that.

8
9

Based on his experience as a

MR. C O L L I N S :

I understand, and I'll

try to lay the foundation with

10

MR. DAVIES:

just

him.

I guess I would

just alert

11

Court that when we get to t h a t , I would

12

probably asking to conduct

13

to determine whether he has the foundation or not.

14
15

MR. C O L L I N S :
we're

the

anticipate

some voir dire

examination

Can I ask you something

while

here?

16

THE C O U R T :

17

MR. C O L L I N S :

Yes.
You may have a different

18

understanding

19

than m i n e , but he and I had a little discussion.

20

need your help.

21

mentioned

22

yet a name of Ron G u n n e r s o n , that is a person that I

23

have never heard of and my client has never heard

24

and we asked for r e b u t t a l , possible

25

witnesses.

0014

about the concept of a rebuttal

We need a ruling on t h i s .

witness
We

He

in his disclosure all possible w i t n e s s e s ,

of,

rebuttal

13

1

My understanding

of a rebuttal witness i s ,

2

typically, someone that the Plaintiff

3

rebut something that the Defendants' -- of the

4

Defendants' c a s e .

5

applies probably

6

Plaintiffs' c a u s e ,

7

Mr. Gunnerson was and what was he was going to say.

8

Mr. Davies refused to tell me that, that it might

9

underline the effectiveness

10

brings up to

S o m e t i m e s , I guess the

term

if there is a surprise in the
I asked Mr. Davies to tell me who

of the witness in this

case.

11

We don't have any surprises

in our

lawsuit,

12

Your Honor.

M s . Roundy has been deposed t w i c e .

13

Davies knows full well what our position is in this

14

case on d a m a g e s , and I have the feeling that M r .

15

Gunnerson is some kind of a surprise, perhaps a

16

surveillance video p e r s o n , and if M r . Davies knows or

17

has reason to believe that he's going to use

18

based on what he thinks he's going to put out in this

19

c a s e , I don't think it's fair.

20

to know that.

21

THE C O U R T :

22

MR. D A V I E S :

I think

I'm

Mr.

him,

entitled

M r . Davies?
I have two p o i n t s , Your

23

Honor.

First of a l l , in this m a t t e r , the Court

24

not ever require us to disclose witnesses to one

25

another or e x h i b i t s .

We've done so v o l u n t a r i l y ,

did

and

9P15

1

I think everything's been disclosed, except

2

matters pertaining

3

voluntarily.

4

c a s e , and we didn't do it for that reason.

5

should point out that the rebuttal witness that M r .

6

Collins mentioned was

7

before.

8

to M r . Gunnerson, but that

I don't think it was required

I haven't already.

10

mean to interrupt.

11

in this
Also, I

of

I could tell you who he is if

Excuse m e , Your Honor.

THE C O U R T :

I'm

I didn't

faced with a rule here of

12

whether I have -- if there hasn't been an

13

to disclose, whether

14

now to disclose.

15

was

someone I have never heard

MR. C O L L I N S :

9

for

obligation

I have the right to obligate

MR. C O L L I N S :

you

There have been

16

interrogatories, Your H o n o r , asking who

17

witnesses are going to b e .

18

exchange I had with M r . Davies a couple of weeks

19

where I asked him who his witnesses were going to b e ,

20

give me a list of who you're going to call and

21

we'll tell y o u , and I did t h a t , and I haven't

22

That may be in the realm of courtesy or t r u t h f u l n e s s ,

23

but if I ask him, he's got an obligation to

24

it.

25

THE C O U R T :

0016

I'll

your

In fact, I remember

an
ago

then
heard.

disclose

hear you further, but if

15

1

that's the way that it has been asked, I will

2

you to

require

respond.

3

MR. D A V I E S :

And let me respond to that as

4

w e l l , Your Honor.

It's my position, and so far

5

worked on all the cases I've

6

someone asked me in interrogatories who my

7

are going to b e , I typically

8

question comes very early in the c a s e , and I say, I

9

don't know y e t , and we will tell you when the

handled, that

say —

tells us to tell y o u .

11

in this c a s e , and you get a scheduling

12

comply with the scheduling

13

response.

14

when
witnesses

usually

10

it's

that

Judge

If you ask a scheduling

order

o r d e r , we'll

order, and that's

our

It's my view that if someone doesn't

like

15

that response, which

is based on an o b j e c t i o n ,

16

their obligation to go before the Court on a motion

17

to compel and get a response from u s .

18

let it g o , and they take no further action

19

response to that o b j e c t i o n , then that's i t .

20

here at c o u r t , and we are not bound by

21

because we objected, and that's what happened

22

We objected.

23

set a scheduling

24

but voluntarily, we've provided information to the

25

extent that we thought appropriate.

We made no response.

it's

But if they
in
We get

anything
here.

The Court did not

order for disclosure of w i t n e s s e s ,

N o w , with

regard

16

1

to --

2

THE C O U R T :

Let me tell you what my

3

attitude i s , Mr. D a v i e s .

4

voluntarily, your obligations to disclose exceed

5

mandated obligations by the Court.

6

MR. DAVIES:

My attitude is t h a t ,

And we indicated

the

in our

7

disclosure that the following would be our w i t n e s s e s ,

8

plus any necessary

9

address the specific

rebuttal w i t n e s s e s .
issue here.

Let me

It's t h i s , if I

10

tell Mr. Collins exactly who this witness i s , and

11

I give him further information

12

will completely

13

witness's testimony

for a very legitimate

14

That's why I called

it r e b u t t a l , because

15

witness's testimony would only be necessary

16

the Plaintiff gets on the stand, when she

17

and lies.

18

need to rebut with this w i t n e s s .

19

truth, I guess that testimony may not be

about that, I think

eviscerate the effectiveness

of

MR. C O L L I N S :

21

MR. D A V I E S :

that
for when

testifies

If she tells

Your Honor -As soon as I tell him w h o

23

going to change her t e s t i m o n y .
MR. C O L L I N S :
the rule w o r k s .

the

necessary.

is and what we h a v e , it changes the testimony.

ooi§_

the

reason.

22

25

it

And if she l i e s , that is a surprise, and I

20

24

if

I guarantee

this
She's

it.

Your Honor, that's not

how

In Rule 26(a) of the Utah Rules

of

17

1

Civil Procedure, it provides an ongoing obligation

2

parties to provide information

3

interrogatories

4

know he was going to use this guy early on, he

5

had an obligation.

6

the rules or under customary

7

as they

responsive

learn them.

to

If they

It doesn't work that way

THE C O U R T :

appropriate

didn't

they have.

9

equation here for just a m i n u t e .

behavior.
that

Let's assume the other side of the
Let's assume that a

10

witness gets on the stand and lies about

11

does the other party have the right to call an

12

undisclosed witness to rebut the lie?

13

say the answer to that is probably y e s .

14

still

under

W e l l , let's just assume

8

MR. C O L L I N S :

something,

And I would

And I think so, Your Honor,

15

and I considered

16

to say his name just so we didn't have a problem

17

case one of the jurors knew him or in case the

18

didn't agree with me about that.

19
20
21

to

handling

THE C O U R T :

it that way, but I decided
in

Court

And so you would agree with

"yes" on t h a t , wouldn't
MR. C O L L I N S :

the

you?
If somebody

is going to say

22

something that's totally unexpected, this concept

23

lying, I don't know how that fits, Your Honor.

24

depends on how you characterize t h a t .

25

essentially what our testimony

If they

of

It
know

is going to be in this

00
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1

case from taking my client's deposition t w i c e , and I

2

have a feeling this has to do with

3

activities.

4

certain

If they think they've got something on her,

5

they know what she's going to say from the

6

depositions.

7

play, to know what they've got.

8

on our case.

9

thought there was going to be something,

We're entitled, as a matter of
There's no

surprises

If there was a surprise, if they

10

unexpected, a surprise to them, something

11

different from what discovery

12

would be one thing.

13

fair

THE C O U R T :

I'm

something
radically

had disclosed,

that

not sure if that applies

14

it's just a surprise.

15

discovery

16

about the discovery, but let's suppose that

there's

17

somebody with a back injury who claims they

can't

18

play tennis or w a t e r - s k i

suppose

19

that they get on the stand and they testify that

20

can't play tennis and w a t e r - s k i .

21

Let's suppose that

if

-- not to use this case.

in

I know

anymore, and let's

nothing

Now, you know in advance that they're

22

to testify to t h a t , because they've done it in a

23

deposition.

24

have the opportunity

25

indeed, they both played tennis and w a t e r - s k i e d ,

0020

And so in r e b u t t a l , does the other
to investigate

they

going

party

and find t h a t ,
and

19

1

they have films of it after the injury?

2

have to disclose

N o w , do they

that?

3

MR* C O L L I N S :

4

MR. DAVIES:

5

MR. C O L L I N S :

S u r e , they d o .
I don't think so.
J u d g e , if they know

it's

6

coming, and they know the essence of what

7

Plaintiffs' testimony

8

a court order on exhibits or on witnesses that

9

reasonably

is going to b e , if there's

been

they

think that they will or may use or if

10

there's interrogatories

11

why should that be any different

12

that we deal with?

13

the

THE COURT:

asking those same q u e s t i o n s ,
from any other

area

Because what it does i s , the

14

party knows whether they've water-skied

15

tennis in the hypothetical that I've

16

know whether they've been asked if they have

17

the injury, and they've testified,

18

c a n n o t , the injury precludes

19

more dramatic than to show testimony

20

l i e , because the party knew when they

21

deposition that it was a lie, and they

22

thereafter that it was a lie when they testified

23

t r i a l , and now the other party has the right to show

24

the witness to be what the witness i s .

25

MR. C O L L I N S :

it.

or played

used, and they
after

I have n o t , I
N o w , what can be
that that is a
said it in the
knew
in

There's no exception to the

0021
20

1

rules for drama, Your H o n o r , should

2

but it doesn't mean that you don't have to

3

it if you know it's

4
5

it be d r a m a t i c ,
disclose

coming.

MR. DAVIES:

This is an odd

discussion.

Maybe M s . Roundy will say that she can't

remember

6

playing tennis more than three or four t i m e s , you

7

know, and maybe she's trying to play t e n n i s , and

8

maybe they're going to have her where she was

9

t e n n i s , and maybe they're going to try to blow

playing
that

10

up into a lie.

I don't think there's going to be any

11

black-and-white

stuff here on her saying that

12

absolutely

13

doesn't have a problem, make her look like

14

doesn't have a problem

15

just a question of degree that's going to be made

16

into something

17

flat can't do something

and act like

in the world.

MR. DAVIES:

One final t h o u g h t , Your Honor,

20

Mr.

21

anyway?

25

The only difference

MR. C O L L I N S :

24

THE COURT:
is.

MV29

it makes to

what are they going to do with

THE COURT:

23

be

W e l l , M r . D a v i e s , do you -- .

and that i s , I don't know what difference

22

she

It could

19

Collins.

she

different.

THE COURT:

18

she

this,

—

I want to see it.
I don't have any idea what

it

I don't have any idea who the witness -- I don't
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WE HOPE WE KNOW WHAT IT TAKES TO CONVINCE A
"TRY TO FIND THE TRUTH

IN THE C A S E , AND

'.lil'ttli Vi'HI HV TIIK I'PERKN"" ' ' N ur

I HOPE WE'VE

liih A P P R O P R I A T E

EVIDENCE, SO THAT YOU CAJN .... -"'-.
I'HT WK IIF.VEF, KNOW, NOk B J I U U L J n£ TRY TO
!S WHAT YOU ARE THINKING AND WHAT'S

IMPORTANT

I ,'irrppOSE THAT YOU COULD FIND FOR
8
9

TO

THE

t'LAINTIFF, AND YOU COULD DO THAT IN THIS W A Y :

YOU

HIi,n i-MNnTnrcv ALL THE E V I D E N C E THAT SHE PERSONALLY
rRESENTED.
AND ONLY THE MOST FAVORABLE
"TTT^ PRESENTED, DISREGARDING
EVIDENCE THAT SHE GAVE.
,T T

mTT„

0 T H E R

THE

EVIDENCE

INCONSISTENT

AND IGNORE EVERYTHING

T E S T I M O N Y AND ALL THE OTHER

AND THEN

PLAINTIFF.

BUT THAT'S NOT HOW THIS W O R K S .
*TOT THE W * v
iOM M

T

T r.w

T SHOULD WORK.

•'OLLIN-

THAT'S

THE IMPRES. _ N

STATEMENTS THAT PERHAPS HE THINKS
i '.",.' 1AA.M I.N Till','

RESENTED THIS

ELSE,

EVIDENCE

THAT CAME IN FROM ALL THE OTHER W I T N E S S E S .
YOU COULD FIND TO THE

THAT

C A S E , AND THAT

I HAVE

E
BEEN

TOO
T

GAINST MY CLIENT

'UDGE TOLD YOU THAT

THE
•T

iFFENDED YOU

BEING TOO

AGGRESSIVE.
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HOPE YOU WON'T HOLD THAT AGAINST MY
I THINK

SOMETHING

THAT'S

CLIENT.

BEEN LOST IN THE

CASE SO FAR IS THE FACT THAT IT IS ABOUT
AND JUSTICE, AS YOU APPLY

JUSTICE.

IT IN FINDING THE FACTS ON

THIS CASE, PERTAINS TO BOTH PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENDANT.

SO FAR, YOU'VE HEARD ABOUT ALL IN THIS

CASE IS ABOUT THE PLAINTIFF,
HAVE TWO PARTIES
TRAVIS

THE

THE ONE PARTY.

IN THIS CASE.

BUT WE

THE OTHER PARTY IS

STALEY.
AND IT'S OUR POSITION THAT THE CLAIMS

ARE BEING MADE
BEEN PURSUED
NOT REAL.
HEARD,

IN THIS CASE AND THE WAY THEY

IS NOT FAIR,

IS NOT R I G H T .

AND

ONE OF THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

I THINK

IT'S NUMBER

ANY WITNESS HAS TESTIFIED
FALSELY TO ANY MATERIAL
THE ENTIRE TESTIMONY

11, WAS

HAVE
IT'S

THAT YOU

THAT IF YOU FEEL

-- WILLFULLY

MATTER,

THAT

TESTIFIED

YOU MAY

DISREGARD

OF THAT W I T N E S S , EXCEPT AS THAT

WITNESS MAY HAVE BEEN CORROBORATED

BY OTHER

CREDIBLE

EVIDENCE.
THIS CASE HAS TO DO EXACTLY AND
WITH THE CREDIBILITY

OF THE PLAINTIFF.

TO PROVE ANY PART OF HER CASE, WHETHER

PRECISELY
ALL SHE HAS

IT'S

THE

LIABILITY OR HOW THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED, OR THE FACT
THAT SHE'S CLAIMING THE INJURIES
ALL BASED COMPLETELY
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SHE'S CLAIMING,

ON HER OWN SAY

SO.

IS

JLQ_
,
3URDEN

•LAINTIF:-

NEGLIGENCE.

ESPECIALLY

F3'

SUGGEST WE

WANT

THE

ON

NEED

MEAN?
EITHER THINK
"AT

WHAT

CLEAR FROM THE

THAT

'I'!.'AVI,'1 Dill

EVIDENCE

WA,1! A P P P 0 P PI A T K , PASEli

nil TIIK

BULK UK THK TESTIMONY AND THE W I T N E S S E S , THEN HE
TNS .
:EALLY TEL"
'-" ' 'J A PERSON

RESPONST

ACCIDENT

PEOPLE

TELL WHO WAS AT FAULT.
"T'S NOT

ALLOWED

THE LAW

IF Y r\ T T

n

"K

xx-o

PRETTY

T'T TELL., THEN THEY

FAIL, BECAUSE THAT o u J S T I C E .

INJURIES

WHAT

GOES

THIS

ALL

RIGHT

ABOUT

A NE "THI S GOES
H I «i E

IJ 1 li "L!"

CLEAR

vr i

NOW LET'S' TALK FOR ft MINUTE
PLAINTIFF

REALLY

JUSTICE.

SO IT'S OUR POSITION THAT

ALSO HAVE

fuK AN

COULDN'T

BECAUSE THAT'S

SO THAT'S

THAT TRAVIS WAS OKAY.

THEN THE LAW

li 1 1 ]CrEI

!: ! i

INJURIES THE PLAINTIFF

HAS,

CASE

THAT OCCURRED

ITSELF

OR HER INJURIES

OF HER

MEDICAL

I "I ! 1 '« ) ^ i

A±
TREATMENT OR WHATEVER,
INSTRUCTIONS

EARLIER,

WILFULLY TESTIFIED

BECAUSE AS I READ FROM
IF YOU FIND THAT

SHE'S

FALSELY, YOU CAN THROW OUT ALL OF

HER TESTIMONY, AND ALL

THE EVIDENCE

WELL, THIS

SHE

PROVIDED.

IS HARSH, BUT THAT

SHE 1 S DONE H E R E .

TO BE PRETTY WELL WHAT

APPEARS

IMAGINE,

YOU WILL, HOW HARD IT IS FOR PEOPLE INVOLVED
DEFENSE OF A CASE LIKE

THIS , WHO ARE TRYING

SUCH AS THOSE

COME UP WITH

MADE HERE, HOW HARD

INFORMATION.

TALKING ABOUT SOMEBODY'S
NOW,

TO

IN AND TELL YOU,

AGAINST

IT IS TO

ESPECIALLY WHEN

YOU'RE

INJURIES.

IT WOULD BE HE VERY EASY

INDEED

AND LET THE PLAINTIFF

FOR US TO JUST SIT BACK

IF

IN THE

PROVE-- OR WHO HAVE TRY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES
CLAIMES

THE

COME

"I'M HURT, I HAVE THESE SYMPTOMS, I

CAN'T PLAY TENNIS, I CAN'T DO THIS, I CAN'T HOLD A
BABY,

I CAN'T DO T H A T . "

THERE AND SAY,
HAVE ANYTHING

DON' T BELIEVE HER.

"PLEASE
TO SHOW

AND FOR US TO JUST

SIT
WE

YOU, BUT PLEASE DON'T

DON'T

BELIEVE

HER. "
THIS CASE
CREATED BY THE PLAINTIFF
HAVE TO DO SOMETHING

IS A FICTION THAT HAS
IN HER H U S B A N D .

AND WE

TO TRY TO COMBAT T H A T .

KNOW THAT CERTAIN JURORS ARE SOMEWHAT

NOW, I

CONCERNED

EVEN OFFENDED ABOUT THE IDEA OF SURVEILLANCE

N028

BEEN

OR

BEING
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LAYING TENNIS AND THERE

3
4

^ Y . : .- TENNIS

'
MOV INC-

THERE'S

-
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TARGET THE WHOLE TIME

*;». -IN h-.r>
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.DKO

ZAUGHT HER PLAYING TENNIS

:'AP:

tfHO

9
CAUGHT HER DOIN' . .

•-s CHANGES HER STOR i
"X

•KK
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"

•• • SAME

III* T

OCTOBER?

vto Kui C H A N G E D , THAx

OCTOBER, WHEN SHE S S T "

SAME

--.. IN

UAJN

xx

WAS

" •*• ^A?T'T TTSE MY

it

WELT
WAY THROUGH T H I S .

-m.«

B E E N

T!TT7

SAME WAY AIL THE

I M E A N , ONE TIME IT'S ONE

"ND ANOTHER TIME IT'S SOMETHING E L S E .
ALWAYS

AJW

EXPLANATION FOR

THERE

THING
IS

EVERYTHING.

SHE ALSO EXPLAINS E V E R Y TIJ 1N (J A W A !i!

t

I," I i

^EAVEN HELP U S , HOW ARE WE EVER GOING TO
,,URK
*

'':"-

PAN?
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Til All
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NATURAL
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THE

TAPE.
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1

ABUSE OF THE SYSTEM.

SO THERE IS NO WAY YOU

2

BELIEVE HER.

3

IN HER OWN T E S T I M O N Y .

HER WHOLE CASE, OR WHAT SHE HAS TO SEE

4

MR. D A V I E S :

5

MR. C O L L I N S :

6

AND YOU CAN'T

BELIEVE

3 0 MINUTES, MR.
OKAY.

HER.

DAVIES.

SO IT WILL JUST BE

ANOTHER MINUTE OR TWO, AND I'LL WRAP

7

CAN

THIS

UP.

WHEN YOU ANSWER THE SPECIAL V E R D I C T

FORM,

8

IT'S CERTAINLY WITHIN YOUR PROVINCE TO ANSWER

9

WAY YOU NEED TO.

BUT WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT

10

STALEY NOT BEING N E G L I G E N T .

11

AND THAT ALSO MEANS HE'S NOT THE PROXIMATE

12

THE INJURIES THE PLAINTIFF AS C L A I M E D .

13

THIS POINT IN TIME IT'S PRETTY IMPOSSIBLE

14

j

15

SO NOTHING

TRAVIS

OR IF YOU DON'T

THAT SHE HAS THIS ARRAY OF INJURIES

THE

KNOW,

CAUSE OF

WELL, AT

SHE

TO

BELIEVE

CLAIMING.

THAT TRAVIS

STALEY DOES

HAS

16

CAUSED INJURIES TO HER, BECAUSE

SHE DOESN'T

HAVE

17

THOSE ARRAY

18

WELL, SHE MADE THE LEFT HAND TURN

19

VEHICLE THAT WAS

20

IMMEDIATE

OF I N J U R I E S .

HAZARD.

WAS THIS

NEGLIGENCE?
IN FRONT OF A

SO CLOSE AS TO C O N S T I T U T E
SHE WAS

NEGLIGENT.

WHAT ARE THE SPECIAL DAMAGES

21
22

DAMAGES?

23

THE PLAINTIFF

24

CLAIMS, IF YOU W I L L .

I JUST WANT TO COMMENT

AND

ON THIS
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GENERAL
BRIEFLY.

IN THIS CASE HAS A BIG SMORGASBORD

THEY ARE TAKING THAT SMORGASBORD

25

AN

AND

OF

j

INSTKIir ,p ri<>i 11 I<I

11

_(^_

If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material matter,
you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness, except as that witness may have been
I niftoboi ilnl by oilier rinlihlr i \ mini N
I r
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INSTRUCTION NO. i f
If you find that the defendant was negligent, you must decide if the plaintiff was
also negligent- If the plaintiff was negligence and the plaintiffs negligence was a proximate
cause of the plaintiffs own injuries, the plaintiffs negligence must be compared to the
negligence of the defendant.
A plaintiff whose negligence is less than 50 percent of the total negligence
causing the plaintiffs injuries may still recover compensation; but theamount will be reduced by
the percentage of the plaintiffs negligence. If the plaintiffs negligence is equal to or greater
than the negligence of the defendant, then the plaintiff will recover nothing.
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